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More on actualist and fundamental public justification in political liberalism 
 
Abstract: The discussion develops further the view that public justification in Rawls’s political 
liberalism, in one of its roles, is actualist in fully enfranchising actual reasonable citizens and 
fundamental in political liberalism’s order of justification. I anchor this reading in the political 
role Rawls accords to general reflective equilibrium, and examine in its light the relationship 
between public justification, pro tanto justification, political values, full justification, the wide 
view of public political culture and salient public reason intuitions. This leaves us with the 
question of how a more plausible, post-Rawlsian political liberalism should understand the 
commitment to discursive respect and robust discursive equality that is reflected in its view of 
actualist and fundamental public justification. 
 
1. Introduction 
This discussion develops further the view that public justification in Rawls‟s political liberalism 
(Rawls 2001; 2005), in one of its role, is actualist and fundamental. It is actualist in relation to 
the social ontology of its constituency: in one of its roles, public justification here includes 
within its constituency on fully enfranchised, equal footing actual reasonable citizens. And it is 
fundamental in relation to its status in political liberalism‟s order of justification: for Rawls, 
conceptions of political justice, including his own theory, Justice as Fairness (henceforth JF), are 
reasonable in the first place only if they are equally acceptable coherently by all actual 
reasonable citizens. Both features come together in Rawls‟s view of the political role of an 
interpersonal, general form of reflective equilibrium–this is the view the reading further 
developed here puts centre stage. For a short label, we might call this reading the actualist deep 
view, or simply the deep view.1  
To develop the view, I reconstruct in its light the relationship between public 
justification, pro tanto justification, and full justification. I also consider how the constraints of 
public reason–as they spring from its defining aim, public justification–relate to Rawls‟s wide 
view of public political culture and salient public reason intuitions. My focus is on how actualist 
and fundamental public justification structurally integrates these ideas, and how Rawls 
compresses into this structure a substantive commitment to liberal political values. It is (mostly) 
this commitment that indexes Rawls‟s view of domestic justice to the standpoint of citizens who 
are reasonable in a problematically substantive sense–which invites familiar concerns about its 
lack of inclusiveness. This leaves us with a question that is essential for an attempt to salvage 
what is plausible in Rawls‟s approach: how should a more plausible, and perhaps more inclusive 
                                                 
 
1 That reflective equilibrium has an important political role in Rawls‟s political liberalism has been 
observed before: see Laden 2014; Lister 2008; Besch 1998: chapter IV; Nielsen 1994. I develop various elements of 
the deep view in a series of discussions, as referenced below. The current discussion comes in tandem with Besch 
2020. Amongst other things, Besch 2020 contrasts actualist and fundamental public justification with Quong‟s 
version of an “internal” conception of political liberalism (Quong 2011), and examines whether Larmore‟s 
hypotheticalizing variant of actualist public justification (see Larmore 2015) can accommodate a key objection to 
political liberalism‟s view of political legitimacy. This puts center stage the question of what view of discursive 
respect and discursive equality public justification should adopt. On discursive respect and discursive equality: see 
also Besch 2014, 2019a and 2019b. Early accounts of Rawls‟s political turn sometimes lean toward interpreting 
public justification in political liberalism in actualist terms: see Hampton 1989 and 1993; Campos 1994; Forst 1994; 
Gaus 1999; Mulhall and Swift 1999; Estlund 1998. 
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political liberalism construe the commitment to discursive respect and robust discursive equality 
that is reflected in its view of actualist and fundamental public justification?  
My discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some needed background. Section 
3 addresses the political role of (general) reflective equilibrium in Rawls‟s political liberalism, 
and relates this to JF‟s Original Position. Section 4 attends to the ideas of pro tanto justification, 
completeness, and the nature of political values. Section 5 considers full justification and its role 
in actualist and fundamental public justification. Section 6 draws out constraints of public reason 
and relates them to Rawls‟s wide view of public political culture and salient public reason 
intuitions. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Preliminaries 
I start with the idea of public justification. To say that a political thing, φ (e.g., exercises of 
political power, political principles, or conceptions of political justice), is publicly justifiable is 
to say, roughly, that φ is authoritatively acceptable by relevant people–alternatively, it is to say 
that φ is justifiable by public reasons, i.e., reasons that are so acceptable. Rawls employs an idea 
of public justification at different levels of argument, including one level that is fundamental in 
its order of justification (or so I claim). At this level, public justification seeks equal acceptability 
by actual reasonable citizens (again, or so I claim). And it is robustly public (Postema 1995): φ‟s 
equal acceptability by relevant people constitutes φ‟s reasonableness. This makes political 
liberalism constructivist in a weak, justificatory sense (Ronzoni 2010; Besch 2004: part I). 
In political liberalism, robustly public justification models a demanding form of equal 
respect. It respects reasonable citizens as equals not only in relation to the content of justice, but 
also in relation to the justification of that content: in taking equal acceptability by such citizens to 
constitute the reasonableness of salient political things, political liberalism respects these citizens 
as equal authorities or co-authors of public justification (Forst 2017a: 134; 2017b). In different 
terms, it extends them equal discursive respect, or models their robust discursive equality (Besch 
2014; 2019a).  
Next, political liberalism extends discursive respect to reasonable citizens, but there is 
little consensus in the field about the content of this idea. For now, only two things matter. First, 
Rawls uses a notion of reasonableness at different levels of argument and builds different content 
into it at different levels (Besch 1998: chapter IV.2). E.g., at JF‟s second stage, “reasonable” 
citizens accept JF‟s substantive principles of justice (see below). But Rawls holds, as well, that 
JF can be reasonable in the first place only if they are suitably acceptable by “us,” i.e., from the 
standpoint of actual reasonable citizens (see below)–and here, reasonableness has different 
content. What matters now is reasonableness only in this more fundamental, politically basic 
sense (Besch 2012 and 2013).  
I shall assume that citizens who are reasonable in Rawls‟s politically basic sense can 
accept political liberalism‟s most important political values, whatever exactly these are (Besch 
2004: section 14; 2012; see also section 4, below). This means that they are not committed to 
reject defining commitments of political liberalism. These commitments involve at least the 
following. A conception of justice, φ, is a political liberalism only if φ is liberal in content and 
political in scope of application and form of justification. If φ is liberal in content, φ prescribes 
that citizens be allocated rights, liberties and opportunities of special priority and all-purpose 
means to make use of these things. If φ is political in scope of application, φ regulates the basic 
structure of a given society only, or its domain of the political.  
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Not least, if φ is political in form of justification, φ does two things. First, φ holds that 
equal acceptability by reasonable citizens justifies politically. And second, φ holds that salient 
political things fail to meet that standard already if reasonable citizens actually disagree 
reasonably about these things–thus, φ attaches a “populist” (Gaus 1996: 130f) interpretation to 
that standard through which justification accords reasonable citizens a high degree of discursive 
influence in justification, or “high-purchase” discursive standing (Besch 2018: 596ff; 2019a: 
471f). Plainly, then, reasonableness here requires more than, say, reasonability. Intelligent 
citizens in good moral standing might not be reasonable in this sense. Accordingly, Rawls‟s 
political liberalism from the ground up invites concerns about its inclusiveness (Hampton 1989; 
Friedmann 2000). 
I noted that Rawls employs public justification and reasonableness at different levels of 
argument. It is hence instructive to consider the structure of his political liberalism. His view 
centres around two questions. First, should the basic structure of a Western liberal democracy be 
regulated on the basis of a political and liberal conception of political justice, or some other kind 
of conception? Second, if it should be regulated on the basis of a political liberalism, what 
variant of political liberalism should be adopted? Rawls answers the first, fundamental question 
in favour of political liberalism: only a political liberalism, if anything, is equally acceptable by 
all actual reasonable citizens. And here, he implicates the idea of robust public justification 
referred to earlier and puts to work his politically basic idea of the reasonable. My discussion 
considers the role of equal acceptability by reasonable citizens only at this level of argument.  
To answer the second question, Rawls suggests JF. JF itself has two stages, S1 and S2. At 
S1, Rawls suggest that reasonable citizens, if they were to reasonably and rationally choose 
principles of basic justice, would adopt JF‟s principles and values (Rawls 2001: 80-134). S2 then 
engages the issue of stability, amongst other things. Rawls defines an ideal of a good citizen–i.e., 
defined as reasonable (and rational) citizens who accept JF‟s principles and values–and argues 
that a society of such citizens that is well-ordered by JF itself would be stable (Rawls 2005: 11f, 
16f, 22-28, 66-82, 94, 97f; Rawls 2001: 8f, 26-29, 116f). He here uses a non-basic idea of the 
reasonable to articulate a non-fundamental idea of public justification. The reasonable citizens of 
JF‟s well-ordered society are to use JF as a public basis of justification in order to apply JF‟s 
principles to matters of basic justice. The question that this idea of public justification helps to 
address is whether JF could contribute to the stability of a political order under the conditions 
that JF‟s principles prescribe. 
The conceptualization of public justification at JF‟s S2 is distinctive for its role at that 
stage. Public justification here does not actually take place; it is a hypothetical justification that 
supposes the hypothetical environment of JF‟s well-ordered society; it fully enfranchises only the 
hypothetical reasonable citizens of that society; and it is conception-applying in that it applies 
JF‟s contents to salient matters of justice. Thus, public justification here is ideal justification: it 
includes in its constituency no actual person, but only the hypothetical reasonable citizens of that 
society.2 And it is conception-applying, or lower-order, in that it applies a given conception of 
political justice to relevant matters.  
                                                 
 
2 We should not confuse the difference between actualist and ideal justification with another, related one. 
Actualist and ideal justification differ in their social ontology: the former, but not the latter, includes within its 
constituency actual people. A second difference concerns the way in which actualist justification includes actual 
people. Different practices of actualist justification can adopt standards that differ in idealization value. Assume JP 
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Current discussions of public justification in Rawls‟s political liberalism often construe it 
along the lines of its conceptualization at JF‟s second stage. Thus, it is often discussed as ideal 
and conception-applying, or perhaps as a highly idealizing, conception-applying form of actualist 
justification.3 But there is more to it. If we understand public justification in such terms, then 
even if we uncouple it from its role specifically at JF‟s second stage, it can confer authority to 
relevant political things only insofar as the conception of justice it builds on is reasonable. On 
the view adopted here, this reverses the order of dependency between the reasonableness of a 
conception of political justice and public justification that is at the heart of Rawls‟s political 
liberalism. Yes, JF uses an idea of public justification at its second stage. But for this to be of 
much consequence, JF itself must be reasonable. But is it? And here, actualist and fundamental 
public justification does its work.  
 
3. Reflective equilibrium  
With this I turn to the political role of Rawls‟s criterion of reflective equilibrium (CRE).4 CRE 
takes the following form (for a conception of political justice, φ, and a set of convictions, S): 
CRE φ is in reflective equilibrium with a set of convictions, S, only if φ coheres with 
S, each member of S is well-considered, and S is internally coherent.5  
Whose considered convictions count? From what doxastic perspective, or standpoint, must 
reflective equilibrium be sought?  
Rawls prioritizes the standpoint of “you and me,” actual people (Rawls 2005: 28).6 Any 
conception of political justice, “to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at 
all levels of generality, on due reflection, or in what I have called elsewhere „reflective 
equilibrium‟” ibid, 8; my emphasis). Thus, to meet CRE, φ must articulate and cohere with “our 
more firm considered convictions,” and “[w]e decide whether the whole conception is acceptable 
by seeing whether we can endorse it upon due reflection” (ibid: 94). Hence, the test of reflective 
equilibrium tests how well φ “articulates our more firm considered convictions of political 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
is a practice of actualist justification that counts φ as justified only if no-one would reject φ when ideally rational. 
JP‟s standard is high in idealization value; JP hence includes actual people, but accords them little influence in 
justification–or low-purchase discursive standing (Besch 2019b: 608ff). However, assume instead that JP requires 
for φ‟s justification merely that relevant people do not reject φ coherently. JP‟s standard now is low in idealization 
value, and can accord people high-purchase discursive standing (ibid.). The point: that justification is actualist does 
not mean that it is populist, or allocates high-purchase standing. But that it accords high-purchase standing does not 
mean that it is actualist: for it might include in its scope only hypothetical people, like JF‟s S2-public justification. I 
assume here that actualist and fundamental public justification includes actual reasonable citizens, and accords them 
high-purchase standing (Besch 2018: 598ff).  
3 E.g., consider the approaches surveyed in Lister 2017. 
4 The discussion of this section overlaps with Besch 2020.  
5 See Rawls 2005: 8, 28, 45.  
6 This needs highlighting. Rawls discusses reflective equilibrium also in relation to CRE‟s role for the ideal 
reasonable citizens of JF‟s well-ordered society: Rawls 2001: 9f. It is plain why he sees reason to do so. In his view, 
political legitimacy requires that political power accord with a conception of justice that is equally acceptable 
coherently by the reasonable citizens over whom such power is exercised (Besch 2020; 2013; section 6, below). But 
then political power within JF‟s well-ordered society is politically legitimate only if it accords with a conception of 
justice that is so acceptable by the ideal reasonable citizens of that society.  
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justice, at all levels of generality, after due examination,” and the conception “that meets this 
criterion” is the one that “is the most reasonable for us” (ibid: 28).  
 But the actual people that Rawls refers to must also be reasonable. Rawls, I take it, 
assumes JF stands some chance to meet CRE. But if the group of people from the perspective of 
whom JF must meet CRE includes on equal footing people who cannot coherently accept 
political liberalism‟s most important political values–i.e., political liberalism‟s unreasonable 
people–then CRE from the outset disqualifies JF. Thus, this group can include on equal footing 
only people who can coherently accept these values, i.e., reasonable citizens. Rawls thinks that 
there are such people and that he and (some of) his readers qualify. 
 However, if the reflective equilibria of “us”, actual reasonable citizens, count, they count 
equally: only if each actual reasonable citizen can coherently accept φ in a manner that satisfies 
CRE will φ be reasonable, or most reasonable, “for us,” the group of all such citizens. Thus: 
Rawls construes the reasonableness of a conception of political justice as a function of its ability 
to attain a form of interpersonal, general reflective equilibrium (Rawls 2001: 31) for actual 
reasonable citizens.7  
 I take it to be unproblematic in this context to understand views to the effect that salient 
political things depend for a salient political merit on being equally acceptable by relevant people 
as reflecting a commitment to the public justifiability of these things, or of claims to the effect 
that they have that merit. Thus, the above suggests we attribute to Rawls Actualist Public 
Justification (for conceptions of political justice, φ): 
APJ φ is reasonable if and only if φ is equally acceptable coherently by, or publicly 
justifiable to, actual reasonable citizens, 
where φ is “equally acceptable coherently” by actual reasonable citizens α and β only if each can 
accept φ in a manner that meets CRE, and citizens are “reasonable” only if they do not reject 
political liberalism‟s most important liberal political values (below, I sometimes refer to the kind 
of reasonableness that APJ confers as “APJ-reasonableness”). On this view, CRE is a condition 
of public justification: Rawls confirms this reading when he writes that a conception of political 
justice, when it attains public justification, is affirmed in reflective equilibrium (Rawls 2001: 29; 
2005: 388). 
 On the reading suggested here, actualist public justification is fundamental in political 
liberalism‟s order of justification. For Rawls, a conception of political justice is reasonable, or 
most reasonable, only if it meets APJ. Where a conception fails to do so, it must be revised or 
rejected, depending on what option is favored by the considered judgments of actual reasonable 
citizens. I note, as well, that APJ-justification is actualist in the first instance in relation to the 
people included within its justificatory scope. APJ-justification accords full discursive respect to 
actual reasonable citizens–as opposed to, e.g., the hypothetical citizens of JF‟s hypothetical, 
well-ordered society.8   
                                                 
 
7 Rawls also distinguishes narrow from wide reflective equilibrium, which differ primarily in the scope and 
depth of the reflection through which equilibrium is reached. Rawls prefers wide equilibrium (Rawls 1974: 8f; 2001: 
29-32; 2005: 387f). Note that reflective equilibrium can be wide even if some commitments remain fixed points 
throughout an agent‟s attempt to attain wide equilibrium. On the deep view, the commitment to not reject liberal 
political values plays the role of such fixed points for reasonable citizens.  
8 Note that there is a difference between inclusion in public justification‟s primary constituency and other 
forms of inclusion. E.g., it has been argued that political liberalism should engage unreasonable people–e.g., through 
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 Before I move on, I observe how APJ relates to Rawls‟s Original Position (OP)–which is 
often assumed to do important justificatory work in its own right in Rawls‟s conception of 
justice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls describes OP as modelling an idea of reasonable and 
rational choice that satisfies pure procedural justice (Rawls 1971: 136ff)–an idea such that if any 
actual citizen cannot accept OP‟s results, such as JF‟s principles of justice, then this must be 
owed to that person‟s irrationality or unreasonableness. However, Rawls‟s mature work suggests 
a different picture: 
[OP] models what we regard–you and I, here and now–as fair and reasonable conditions 
for the parties [of OP] ... [OP] also models what we regard as appropriate restrictions on 
reasons for adopting a political conception of justice ... Given these features, we 
conjecture that the conception of political justice the parties would select is the 
conception that you and I, here and now, would regard as reasonable and rational and 
supported by the best reasons. Whether the conjecture is borne out will depend on 
whether you and I, here and now, can, on due reflection, endorse the principles adopted. 
(Rawls 2001: 30; all emphases are added.) 
OP models what “you and I, here and now” see as proper constraints on reasons to adopt a 
conception of political justice. OP‟s s success as such a model turns on whether OP‟s results 
match what “you and I, here and now” regard as reasonable and rational, or as supported by the 
best reasons. Accordingly, OP is “a means of public reflection and self-clarification” that aims to 
help “us” attain “deeper self-understanding” and “greater coherence among all our judgements,” 
with the help of which “we can attain wider agreement among one another” (Rawls 2005, p. 26).  
What people does Rawls refer to? As I read him, these are the people from the standpoint 
of whom JF must be coherently acceptable in order to qualify as reasonable. This suggests: OP is 
a reconstructive tool to clarify implications of the self-understanding of actual reasonable 
citizens. OP‟s success as such a tool turns on whether OP‟s results cohere with their considered 
judgments–which they assess from their perspective. If OP‟s results match their self-
understanding, this can advance JF‟s public justification. But if OP‟s results do not do this, OP 
does not aid JF‟s public justification–in which case reasonable citizens must decide whether to 
revise or reject JF. Either way, their considered judgments have the last word. 
 On this reading, it is not the case that if actual citizens cannot accept OP‟s results, this 
must speak to their irrationality or unreasonableness. At least in relation to actual reasonable 
citizens, the dependency is reversed: if they cannot coherently accept OP‟s results, this calls into 
question the reasonableness of OP (or, for that matter, JF) if this is the conclusion favoured by 
their considered judgments. Thus, in at least one sense OP does not model pure procedural 
justice: OP‟s results depend for their reasonableness on matching the considered judgments of 
actual reasonable citizens, including judgments about what is or is not politically just.  
 One upshot: if anything, Rawls‟s mature view of the role of OP confirms the fundamental 
status of actualist public justification in political liberalism‟s order of justification. OP does not 
compete with APJ. Rather, OP is subservient to APJ in that it is a tool to assist actual reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
arguments from conjecture (Rawls 2005: 465) or buck-passing strategies (Quong 2011: 236ff). But this does not 
include them in public justification‟s primary constituency: it does not recognize them as people for whom φ must 
equally be acceptable for φ to be APJ-reasonable (see Besch 2012).  
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citizens in clarifying their considered judgments–while OP‟s usefulness as such a tool (and so its 
role in political liberalism) depends on whether its result are equally acceptable by these people.  
 
4. Pro tanto justification 
We have just seen how actualist and fundamental public justification relates to OP. I now address 
two other ideas of justification that surface in Rawls‟s Reply to Habermas (Rawls 2005: 372-
434)–pro tanto and full justification. What matters here is their relationship to actualist and 
fundamental public justification. I start with pro tanto justification.  
What is pro tanto justification? Rawls answers with a focuses on the justification of 
conceptions of political justice. To justify a conception of political justice, φ, pro tanto is to 
show, or demonstrate, that φ offers an ordering of political values that is “complete,” 
[t]hat is, the political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that 
those values alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all or nearly all questions 
concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice. This is the meaning of pro tanto 
justification. By examining a wide range of political questions to see whether a political 
conception can always provide a reasonable answer we can check to see if it seems to be 
complete. (Rawls 2005: 386; see also 454ff; first emphasis is added.) 
How does this contribute to the justification of a conception of political justice? One part of an 
answer seems to surface in Rawls‟s claim that φ, when it is complete, answers “all or nearly all 
questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice” by public reason–where public 
reason “aims for public justification” (ibid: 465), or equal acceptability by reasonable citizens. 
Another part is entailed in the view that completeness is attained by ordering political values. I 
first address political values and then tie in public reason. After this, I consider degrees of 
completeness and different views of pro tanto justification. An answer to the question just asked 
will then emerge. 
Rawls‟s view of political values is sophisticated. These values share three features.9 Two 
are prominent: 
(i) if δ is a political value, then δ is part of, or entailed in, the public political 
tradition of a relevant society, S; as Rawls exclusively focuses on the USA of 
his time with its liberal political tradition, as a value that is part of this tradition, 
δ is also liberal in content); 
(ii) if δ is a political value, then δ applies to S‟s domain of the political only.  
Rawls calls values “general” if they are non-political in the sense of (ii), or in relation to their 
scope of application. He calls values “comprehensive” if they are non-political in the sense of (i), 
their source or origin. He stipulates that all comprehensive values are general. And he assumes 
that all comprehensive values not only are not equally acceptable by all reasonable citizens, but 
that they are the subject of (actual or probable) reasonable disagreement between them.  
This brings us to a third feature of political values. It is reflected not in what Rawls says 
about their nature, but in the use that he makes exclusively of ideas or conceptions that he claims 
to be political values. Rawls assumes not only that there are values that are coherently acceptable 
by all reasonable citizens, but also that there are values that no such citizen can coherently reject 
                                                 
 
9 This follows Besch 1998: chapter I.3. See also Leland and Wietmarschen 2012. 
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(call the latter values “reasonably non-rejectable”). Rawls assumes, as well, that values of the 
two kinds are not comprehensive, but are always political. This suggest,  
(iii) if δ is a political value, δ has membership in the only family of values that 
includes values that are coherently acceptable by all reasonable citizens and 
values that are reasonably non-rejectable.  
This ties completeness to public reason and its aim, public justification. If φ answers relevant 
political questions on the basis of political values, these answers are based on values that are 
acceptable, if not non-rejectable, by all reasonable citizens. Other things being equal, then, these 
answers can be used in public reason, i.e., reasoning under the aim of equal acceptability by all 
reasonable citizens, when these questions arise in political practice. This renders φ useful, and 
recommends it, if we also assume that conceptions of political justice should be able to offer 
guidance in such matters that is consonant with that aim. Thus: to justify φ pro tanto is to show 
that φ is useful in this way.  
Correspondingly, Rawls-type completeness can come in degrees. Several conceptions of 
political justice might provide answers “to all or nearly all questions concerning constitutional 
essentials and basic justice,” while some are better at this than others–e.g., φ1 might provide 
more or more important answers than φ2. Consequently, there are at least two readings of pro 
tanto justification. On a strong reading, φ possesses pro tanto justification not simply if φ passes 
the threshold of completeness, but only if φ provides an ordering of political values that is more 
complete than the orderings offered by φ‟s competitors. On a weak reading, φ possesses pro 
tanto justification already if φ passes the threshold of completeness.  
On the strong reading, to reject a pro tanto justifiable conception of political justice is to 
reject the conception that best serves the aim of public justification, or that is most useful, given 
that aim. But this, I take it, cannot be reasonable on Rawls‟s account. On the weak reading, to 
reject a pro tanto justifiable conception does not mean to reject the most useful conception so 
long as there is another pro tanto justifiable conception that is more complete, and hence more 
useful. And here, it can be reasonable to reject a pro tanto justifiable conception; in fact it can be 
unreasonable not to do so.  
Which reading sits better with Rawls‟s views? This seems to be the weak reading. In his 
later writings, Rawls uses the label “political liberalism” as referring to a family of conceptions 
of justice (see Rawls 2005: 450ff). Each member of this family provides an ordering of political 
values, and so will possess some degree of completeness and be able to attain some degree of pro 
tanto justification. And, of course, Rawls assumes that it is, or can be, reasonable to accept JF at 
the expense of other members of that family. But then it can be reasonable to reject a conception 
of political justice even if it attains (a degree of) pro tanto justification. This suggests the weak 
reading. So construed, the possession of (some degree of) completeness and the ability to attain 
(some degree of) pro tanto justification are best seen as markers of a conception‟s membership in 
the family of political liberalism. 
Does this answer why demonstrating completeness contributes to justification? Not yet. 
Consider how pro tanto justification relates to public justification. Two possibilities are these:  
I1  Public justification identifies the set of APJ-reasonable conceptions of political 
justice, while pro tanto justification shows, or is part of what identifies, which 
member in this set is most useful. 
I2 To demonstrate that a conception of political justice possesses pro tanto 
justification is part of, or contributes to, its public justification: to demonstrate 
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completeness is to show that φ can be used in ways that are APJ-reasonable.    
Which interpretation is preferable? Upfront, both seem plausible, given the few things Rawls 
says about the nature of pro tanto justification in relation to conceptions of political justice. Still, 
the above recommends I2. Why?  
I assume that all APJ-reasonable conceptions of political justice are political liberalisms. 
If so, all possess some degree of pro tanto justification. But if we know that φ is APJ-reasonable, 
what job could then be served by showing that φ is also pro tanto justifiable? That is, it seems 
that I1 would have to construe pro tanto justification in terms of the strong reading of such 
justification identified earlier. Pro tanto justification makes a contribution to the justification of 
an APJ-reasonable conception if such a conception possesses pro tanto justification only if it best 
serves the aim of public justification, or is most useful, given that aim. As we have seen, though, 
there are reasons to prefer the weak reading of pro tanto justification–this suggests I2. According 
to I2, pro tanto justification is part of public justification, or, perhaps, a modality of it. On this 
reading, in order to show that φ is publicly justifiable in APJ‟s sense, one important thing to do is 
to show that φ is useful in the sense that φ‟s political values can provide APJ-reasonable answers 
to “all or nearly all” questions about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.  
Not least, we can distinguish in Rawls‟s view pro tanto justification a structural and a 
substantive element. Structurally, pro tanto justification is a form of justification that proceeds 
by demonstrating that a candidate conception of political justice can answer a relevant corpus of 
relevant questions on the basis of values that are equally acceptable by all relevant people, so 
that these people can use these answers when they reason publicly, under an aim of equal 
acceptability by relevant people. Rawls grafts on this structure a substantive commitment to 
political liberalism‟s political values–values, that is, that are indexed to a given political tradition, 
that are liberal in content, that apply to the domain of political only, and, importantly, that are 
equally acceptable, if not non-rejectable, by political liberalism‟s reasonable citizens.  
That Rawls‟s political liberalism indexes pro tanto justification to political values is 
unsurprising, given its commitment to extend equal discursive respect to actual reasonable 
citizens. But we can disentangle Rawls‟s insight that completeness matters for the 
reasonableness of a conception of political justice from his view of the scope of discursive 
respect. If we believe that discursive respect should not be restricted to political liberalism‟s 
reasonable citizens (or at least not prior to further argument), we can agree that a conception of 
political justice must be complete, but disagree with or bracket the claim that its completeness 
must be a function of its ordering exclusively of Rawls-type political values.  
At any rate: even within Rawls‟s framework, we cannot know in terms of what values 
completeness must be demonstrated unless we know what values are equally acceptable, if not 
non-rejectable, by all relevant people. And for this, we need to know who should be accorded 
discursive respect in public justification. Rawls-type political values (and they alone) may enter 
the pool of values in terms of which completeness must be demonstrated just in case these values 
(and they alone) are equally acceptable, if not non-rejectable, by all relevant people.  
 
5. Full justification  
Rawls claims that a conception of political justice must be capable of “full justification” (Rawls 
2005: 386). What is this? Full justification   
is carried out by an individual citizen as a member of civil society. (I assume that each 
citizen affirms both a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine.) In this case, the 
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citizen accepts a political conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in 
some way into the citizen‟s comprehensive doctrine as either true or reasonable, 
depending on what the doctrine allows. (Ibid.)  
Roughly: a conception of political justice, φ, has full justification for an agent if she accepts φ 
and φ is (or can be) “in some way” embedded into her comprehensive doctrine. Thus, full 
justification involves integrating a conception of political justice with the contents of 
comprehensive doctrines (or vice versa–see below). 
Why does this matter? First, full justification matters in relation to the stability of a 
conception of political justice: when φ attains full justification for an agent, her acceptance of φ 
is substantiated by her comprehensive doctrine and so can be stable, or more so than it might 
otherwise be. Second, full justification matters in relation the aim of reasonable overlapping 
consensus: for φ to attain reasonable overlapping consensus is or involves for φ to attain full 
justification for each reasonable citizen.10 Accordingly, third, full justification seems to matter 
for public justification–at least if we for now assume that φ, to attain reflective equilibrium for 
each reasonable citizen, must be capable of full justification for each of them. Especially the 
third reason makes full justification relevant here.     
Here, then, are two observations. First, if full justification (partly) is a matter of 
embedding a conception of justice into an agent‟s comprehensive doctrine, then it can come in 
degrees. One conception, φ1, might be able to integrate more fully with the contents of Betty‟s 
comprehensive doctrine (i.e., her comprehensive views) than another, φ2; hence, φ1 might be 
able to be more fully justified for her than φ2.  
Second, to require conceptions of justice to be capable of full justification seems to 
elevate the role of comprehensive doctrines in public justification. The above suggests this:  
1.  To be publicly justifiable–i.e., to meet APJ–φ must be coherently acceptable by 
each reasonable citizen in a manner that meets CRE, the criterion of reflective 
equilibrium. To this end, φ must be capable of full justification for each 
reasonable citizen: after all, if φ cannot integrate at all with their respective 
comprehensive doctrines, how could it be coherent for them to accept φ? The 
point: as φ‟s public justifiability depends on its capacity for full justification, φ 
must be tailored to the contents of the comprehensive doctrines of the citizens 
for whom φ must be capable of full justification.  
Rawls denies the conclusion. He stresses that the contents of comprehensive doctrines “have no 
normative role in public justification” (Rawls 2005: 387)–which implies that a conception of 
political justice must not be tailored to the contents of any comprehensive doctrine. What is in 
play here is political liberalism‟s signature commitment to justificatory neutrality (Larmore 
2015: 67), i.e., the view that public justification should avoid justifiers or reasons, widely 
conceived, that are the subject of reasonable disagreement–construed as disagreement that can 
arise between reasonable citizens (Rawls 2005: 55; Larmore 2015: 68-74; Macedo 1991: 47, 71). 
For Rawls, no conception of political justice counts as equally acceptable by all reasonable 
                                                 
 
10 As it is worth noting, for Rawls, political liberalism is to pursue the aim of reasonable overlapping 
consensus not only in JF‟s well-ordered liberal society, where all doctrines are reasonable, but also here and now, 
where not all doctrines are reasonable. But in on-ideal conditions, it seeks an overlapping consensus only in relation 
to the reasonable doctrines that are then present (Rawls 2005: 36; Besch 1998: chapter I).    
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citizens that is, or is based on what is, the subject of (actual or probable) reasonable disagreement 
(Besch 1998: chapter II; 2017: 599f). And he stipulates that all comprehensive views are the 
subject of reasonable disagreement. Hence, for Rawls, no comprehensive view can serve as a 
justifier or reason in public justification.  
Thus, political liberalism reaches an impasse. Its commitment to justificatory neutrality 
pushes it to deny comprehensive doctrines a justificatory role in public justification–which 
excludes a justificatory contribution of full justification. But the role it gives to the reflective 
equilibria of reasonable citizens in public justification pulls in the opposite direction if we 
assume (plausibly, it seems) that the availability of these equilibria depends on the availability of 
some level of coherence between a conception of political justice and the comprehensive views 
of reasonable citizens. And these things are in tension since the requirement of justificatory 
neutrality must be satisfied not only in public justification that is carried out on the basis of a 
reasonable conception of political justice (call this conception-applicative justification), but also 
in public justifications that establishes such a conception as reasonable to begin with (call this 
conception-constitutive justification).   
Of course, one way out of this impasse is to reject that justificatory neutrality must be 
satisfied also in conception-constitutive justification. E.g., we might adopt a convergence view of 
the justification of a conception of political justice that allows political and non-political values 
to serve as justifiers or reasons for a conception of political justice, while we require justificatory 
neutrality of conception-applicative justifications that apply a convergence-justified conception 
of justice to matters of basic justice. And that such a conception can attain full justification might 
matter greatly for its ability to be convergence-justifiable as reasonable.  
Alas, Rawls does not take this option. Instead, he denies that public justification depends 
on full justification. Yes, it must be possible to embed a reasonable conception of political justice 
into the reasonable doctrines of relevant people. But this is not a condition of public justification. 
If anything, it is a constraint on comprehensive doctrines. How so? Consider again a passage 
quoted from earlier already:  
Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of political society carry 
out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several 
reasonable comprehensive views. In this case, reasonable citizens take one another into 
account as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse that political 
conception, and this mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the public culture of 
political society. A crucial point here is that while the public justification of the political 
conception for political society depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines, this 
justification does so only in an indirect way. That is, the express contents of these 
doctrines have no normative role in public justification; citizens do not look into the 
content of others‟ doctrines, and so remain within the bounds of the political. Rather, they 
take into account and give some weight to only the fact–the existence–of the reasonable 
overlapping consensus itself. (Rawls 2005: 387.) 
While the first sentence is compatible with the view that full justification (and, by that token, 
reasonable overlapping consensus) is a condition of public justification, the rest of the passage 
stresses the opposite. Yes, public justification depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
but only “indirectly.” What matters is only that they can be expected to endorse and “in some 
way” embed a conception of political justice that reasonable citizens accept as their “shared 
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political conception.” Accordingly, in publicly justifying such a conception, reasonable citizens 
“remain within the bounds of the political.” 
 As I read this, it puts to work two sets of stipulations. First, the stipulation that reasonable 
citizens are committed to the view that a conception of political justice must be justifiable on 
grounds that are equally acceptable by all reasonable citizens. On the assumption that political 
values alone can serve as such grounds, this commits reasonable citizens to publicly justify such 
a conception exclusively on the basis of political values–or to “remain within the bounds of the 
political.” Second, Rawls assumes that reasonable citizens affirm reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines (Rawls 2005: 59), but he stipulates, as well, that reasonable doctrines cohere with the 
commitments of reasonable citizens.11 Consequently, at least if φ is the only conception of 
political justice that is so justifiable, reasonable doctrines may be expected to endorse and “in 
some way” embed φ.  
Thus: public justification does not depend on, but rather dominates full justification, and 
it does this in a manner that leaves no substantive role to full justification in the selection of a 
conception of political justice. Call this the strict view of full justification. It secures the role of 
justificatory neutrality as a constraint on conception-constitutive justifications. And it does this 
by limiting the doxastic material that CRE operates on. Recall: APJ requires φ to be coherently 
acceptable by reasonable citizens–coherently, that is, in a way that meets CRE. Upfront, this 
suggests that φ‟s coherent acceptability depends, as well, on φ‟s ability to cohere with the 
comprehensive views of these citizens. But the strict view denies this possibility. And so φ‟s 
coherent acceptability can only turn on φ‟s ability to cohere with the political values that 
reasonable citizens adopt–which by hypothesis are equally acceptable by all reasonable citizens. 
This, then, is one upshot of Rawls‟s dictum that a conception of political justice must be 
“freestanding” (Rawls 2005: 374ff).     
There might be an opening for a different view of the role of full justification–call it the 
relaxed view. Rawls, we have seen, concedes that it can be reasonable to reject one pro tanto 
justifiable conception of political justice (or one variant of political liberalism) in favour of 
another. Now, the public justification of a conception of political justice might not exclusively 
involve demonstrating its completeness. But assume it mainly takes this form. On the relaxed 
view, then, considerations of full justification can provide grounds to publicly prefer one pro 
tanto justifiable conception over another if and when it is equally acceptable by all reasonable 
citizens to let these considerations make this difference. Suppose there are two pro tanto 
justifiable conceptions, φ1 and φ2, where φ1 integrates more fully than φ2 with the reasonable 
doctrines of (some) reasonable citizens. On the relaxed view, this provides ground to prefer φ1, 
if preferring φ1 for this reason is suitably acceptable.  
Should we prefer the strict view or the relaxed view? This is unclear. Both track the 
priority of the aim of equal acceptability by actual reasonable citizens. The strict view translates 
this priority into the requirement that justificatory neutrality be satisfied in conception-
constitutive justifications–this is part of the point of political liberalism‟s application of the 
principle of toleration to philosophy (Rawls 2005: 10), and it reflects the depth of its 
commitment to accord equal discursive respect to actual reasonable citizens (Besch 2018: 598ff). 
                                                 
 
11 This differs from Rawls‟s official view of reasonableness in comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 2005: 59), 
but it reflects the criterion of their reasonableness actually at work in view. See Besch 1998: chapter I.3, and Mandle 
1999: 90-94. 
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But the relaxed view often seems in play where Rawls suggests that the compatibility of a 
conception of political justice with the comprehensive doctrines of reasonable citizens marks an 
important merit that has to do with its public justifiability. After all, as he puts it in a passage 
quoted earlier, public justification happens when reasonable citizens carry out full justification, 
while CRE conditions the reasonableness of a conception of justice.  
But for what is relevant now, we need not decide between the strict view and the relaxed 
view. What matters here is only that both views reflect the fundamental role of public 
justification. 
 
6. The wide view of public political culture and the public reason intuitions  
Before I conclude, I address two additional matters. First, how does public justification relate to 
Rawls‟s “wide” view of public political culture? Second, how does political liberalism‟s view of 
the scope of public justification relate to its idea of political legitimacy and the “public reason 
intuitions” (Enoch 2015: 114ff)? I address both matters in turn. 
Recall some constraints that Rawls ties into public justification: 
2.   To be publicly justifiable (i.e., to meet APJ), φ must be coherently acceptable 
by each reasonable citizen: 
(i)  φ must hence be based on justifiers or reasons that satisfy justificatory 
neutrality: these justifiers or reasons must not be the subject of 
reasonable disagreement; 
(ii)  φ must hence be based on political values only; 
(iii)  φ must hence be based on values that are indexed to a given political 
tradition, that are liberal in content, that apply to the domain of political 
only, and that are equally acceptable, if not non-rejectable, by political 
liberalism‟s reasonable citizens; 
and, perhaps:  
(iv)  φ must be complete and more capable of full justification than other 
eligible conceptions of political justice. 
The first three constraints, and perhaps all four, are necessary for φ‟s public justifiability. And as 
public reason “aims for” public justification, as Rawls puts it, it is natural to assume that public 
reasoning, at least when it carries out public justification, must comply with these constraints. 
We may hence call them the constraints of public reason.  
At first pass, this seems to contradict Rawls‟s wide view of public political culture. 
According to Neal (2008), the wide view relaxes Rawls‟s inclusive view of public reason–which 
itself marks a more inclusive departure from his initial, exclusive view. According to the 
exclusive view, reasonable citizens may not invoke non-political values or reasons in public 
political debate. Rawls later opts for a more permissive, inclusive view of public political debate 
(Rawls 2005: 247f). On this view, reasonable people may invoke non-political values or reasons 
in public political debate provided (i) this strengthens the ideal public reason and (ii) these values 
or reasons are at the time accompanied by suitably supportive political values. The wide view 
finally relaxes this by replacing (ii) with the weaker condition that reasonable citizens must “in 
due course” provide “public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive 
doctrine is said to support” (ibid: 453; see also 442, 462ff). Thus, Rawls concedes that 
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reasonable citizens may invoke non-political values or reasons in public political debate so long 
as doing so remains suitably tethered to public reason.  
But if public political debate invokes non-political values or non-public reasons, it cannot 
instantiate reasoning that satisfies the constraints of public reason. Thus, is Rawls‟s wide view 
incompatible with these constraints? It is not. Recall what labels are in play: while Rawls 
proposes the exclusive and inclusive views as views of public reason, he refers to the wide view 
as a view of public political culture (ibid.). And he contrasts what people may do on the wide 
view and what they must do to satisfy the constraints of public reason (Rawls 2005: 455f, 461f). 
The shift in labels from “public reason” to “public culture” matters. As seems to herald that not 
all stretches of debate that instantiate public political culture–say, public political debate–must 
also instantiate public reason.  
This prompts a way to reconcile Rawls‟s wide view with the constraints of public reason. 
We can understand the view in light of a distinction between two idioms or strands of public 
political debate, namely, (i) debate that (directly) aims for public justification and to which the 
constraints of public reason apply, and (ii) debate that does not (directly) aim for this and that 
need not meet these constraints. Accordingly, only type-(i)-debate instantiates public reason 
proper and must meet the relevant constraints. In light of (i) and (ii), the wide view does not 
entail that public political debate must always instantiate public reason, or must do so even when 
debate invokes non-political values or reasons. Instead, it articulates a more differentiated view 
of public political debate according to which such debate is not co-terminus with an exercise of 
public reason, and hence need not always meet the constraints of public reason (although the 
view would still assume that such debate must always remain tethered to public reason). This, I 
submit, is how we should understand Rawls‟s wide view of public political culture.  
Not least, I relate APJ to political liberalism‟s idea of political legitimacy.12 On Rawls‟s 
liberal principle of legitimacy (LPL), political power must be exercised “in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” (Rawls 2005: 217). 
Yet these must be principles and ideals that are justifiable as reasonable and rational within a 
conception of political justice that is reasonable (Besch 2012 and 2013). And such a conception 
counts as reasonable only if meets APJ–which reflects political liberalism‟s commitment to 
extend equal discursive respect to actual reasonable citizens. The point: political power here is 
politically legitimate only if it is justifiable on the basis of a conception of political justice that is 
equally acceptable by all actual reasonable citizens.  
Of course it is problematic to from the outset restrict (full) inclusion in the constituency 
of public justification to political liberalism‟s reasonable citizens–a point that has often been 
made. But what matters now is that this is not incompatible with political liberalism‟s 
understanding of the “public reason intuitions” (Enoch 2015: 114ff). These intuitions amount to 
the view that political power can be reconciled with the freedom and equality of citizens only if 
it is equally justifiable to them. It has been argued that political liberalism cannot accommodate 
these intuitions since it is at least initially com mitted to reconcile the freedom and equality of all 
citizens with political power (ibid: 122-126); yet if such power is equally justifiable only to 
reasonable people, little is done to accommodate the freedom and equality of anyone else.  
                                                 
 
12 The remainder of this section follows Besch 2020. 
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However, political liberalism sits better with a different interpretation. As Macedo puts it, 
it respects as “free and equal (…) all those who pass certain threshold tests of reasonableness: we 
respect those whose disagreement with us does not impugn their reasonableness” (Macedo 1991: 
47, 71). This suggests: political liberalism aims to reconcile with political power the freedom and 
equality not of everyone, but of every citizen that it respects as free and equal, namely, 
reasonable citizens. The point: political liberalism‟s restriction on the scope of discursive respect 
and hence its restriction on the constituency of actualist and fundamental public justification 
coheres with its understanding of the public reason intuitions. Thus, political liberalism indexes 
not only discursive respect and public justification to the standpoint of reasonableness, but also 
its attempt to reconcile political power with freedom and equality. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This discussion developed a reading of Rawls according to which an actualist idea of public 
justification plays a fundamental role in his political liberalism. According to this reading, 
Rawls‟s political liberalism holds that any conception of political justice, to be reasonable in the 
first place, must be equally acceptable coherently by actual reasonable citizens.  
We found that Rawls‟s mature view of OP confirms the fundamental role of actualist 
public justification. OP‟s role depends on whether OP‟s results are suitably acceptable by the 
actual reasonable citizens from the perspective of whom any conception of political justice must 
coherently be acceptable in order to be reasonable in the first place.  
Rawls-type pro tanto justification, too, ties in with actualist and fundamental public 
justification. We cannot know in terms of what values pro tanto justification must demonstrate 
completeness unless we know what values are suitably acceptable by relevant citizens. That 
Rawls‟s political values (and they alone) may enter the pool of values in terms of which 
completeness must be demonstrated springs from the stipulation that only these values are 
suitably acceptable by relevant people.  
Next, full justification ties in with actualist public justification insofar as it tracks the 
priority Rawls attaches to equal acceptability by actual reasonable citizens. On the strict view, 
full justification is dominated by actualist and fundamental public justification. On the relaxed 
view, full justification can make a limited contribution to such justification if and when this is 
consistent with the aim of coherent acceptability by actual reasonable citizens.    
Not least, the wide view of public political culture and the public reason intuitions cohere 
with actualist and fundamental public justification. The latter coheres with it insofar as political 
liberalism‟s view of political legitimacy requires merely that political power be reconciled with 
the freedom and equality of reasonable citizens. The former coheres with it as the wide view 
allows for more than one idiom of public political debate–where one idiom is, or can be, subject 
to the constraints of public reason as they spring from APJ. 
All this supports the view that Rawls‟s political liberalism builds on an idea of actualist 
and fundamental public justification that extends discursive respect to actual reasonable citizens, 
or models their robust discursive equality. But it also brings out limitations of Rawls‟s view: the 
constraints political liberalism imposes on actualist and fundamental public justification, and 
with it on discursive respect, limit its plausibility. APJ-justification coheres with a political and 
liberal view of justice since (i) APJ-justification includes within its scope on fully enfranchised 
footing only reasonable citizens, while Rawls stipulates that (ii) liberal political values, and they 
alone, are suitably acceptable by such citizens. Without (i) and (ii), the commitment to actualist 
and fundamental public justification seems to give expression to emancipatory and egalitarian 
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values that might make the view attractive for many. With (i) and (ii) in place, however, the view 
looks like a form of public dogma (Besch 2012).  
This leaves us with questions. Suppose we reject (i) and (ii), above. What conception of 
political justice is publicly justifiable if we adopt a different, perhaps more inclusive view of the 
standpoint from which conceptions of political justice must equally be acceptable coherently, or 
a different, perhaps more inclusive view of the values that such a conception must contain? That 
is, how should actualist and fundamental public justification in political liberalism construe its 
underlying commitment to discursive respect and robust discursive equality?  
If we aim to salvage in Rawls‟s view what seems attractive, then these issues are amongst 
the many that stand to be explored more. 
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